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MANAGEMENT OF THE FREQUENCY SPECTRUM*
WILLIAM H. MECKLING**
The most striking feature of the history of domestic and international
frequency spectrum management has been the general failure to recognize
the fundamental nature of the problem. The wellspring of the confusion
has been the belief that interference is a technical problem peculiar to the
use of frequency spectrum. In fact, interference is simply a manifestation
of scarcity. It is not possible for all those who would like to use the spec-
trum to do so without affecting the amount of the resource available to
others. The analogy to other resources, land, labor, and capital, is so ob-
vious as not to require elaboration.
Any effort to improve frequency management must be built on a recog-
nition that frequency spectrum is an economic resource in no significant
way different from the mass of other resources available to society. By the
same token, the central function of any frequency management system must
be to resolve the conflict among competing potential uses for the resource.
From the standpoint of social action, the central question is what institu-
tional framework should be promulgated to resolve this conflict.
While this paper is directed primarily to discussing alternative systems
for managing frequency spectrum, the choice of such a system is not the
important barrier to improvement in the existing situation. The real bar-
rier to progress is the problem of provoking political action. Frequency spec-
trum is managed today in much the same manner as the commons were on
feudal estates in the Middle Ages; while we may not be able to prescribe the
optimal management system, we can improve substantially on that state
of affairs.
Frequency spectrum is the only resource of any consequence for which:
(1) All use rights are defined by government and then given away;
* This paper was among those commissioned jointly by Resources for the Future, Inc.
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(2) Recipients of rights are not permitted to sell all or any portion of
their rights, hence, no rights holder has any incentive to economize
on the use thereof or transfer his rights to someone who values them
more highly;
(3) The total amount of the resource available is subdivided, with each
piece alloted to specific services (e.g., land mobile) and no transfer
permitted among services;
(4) Significant portions of the resource are allocated to specific services,
but the number of individuals who can use the resource is unlimited,
i.e., within certain service categories spectrum is treated as a free
good;
(5) Because the government completely controls use rights, government
agencies get first consideration in their distribution-again, at no
cost;
(6) Potential current users have no incentive to take into account future
value, i.e., of withholding use today in favor of more valuable pos-
sible future uses.
There is no resource for which the misuse, in economic terms, is more dra-
matic. Frank H. Knight summarized the dilemma very nicely when he
said,
. , * the problem of social action, from the economic standpoint,
is chiefly that of getting people-those in control of social policy,
which in a democracy ultimately means the electorate-to act in ac-
cord with principles which when stated in simple and set terms are
trite even to the man in the street.'
I. REFORMING THE PRESENT SYSTEM
The basic policy choice we have with respect to institutional frameworks
is between piece-meal improvements in the existing system and abandon-
ment of it in favor of a market system. The crucial factor that distinguishes
these two alternatives is whether the rights which individuals acquire can
be bought and sold. The introduction of a market system has been dis-
cussed in various papers, especially in the work of Professor Ronald Coase.2
I. Knight, Socialism: The Nature of the Problem, in FREEDOM AND REFORM 130 (F.
Knight ed. 1957).
2, Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1959).
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There has been less systematic analysis of more modest changes to the exist-
ing framework.
A. The Criterion Problem
A modified version of the present system which does not use prices as
a means of allocating frequencies, must immediately face the criterion prob-
lem.
Neither Congress nor any of the frequency management authorities have
ever seriously addressed this question. They have never given serious ex-
plicit consideration to what criterion or criteria ought to be used in de-
ciding how frequencies will be allocated or assigned. They do, of course,
consciously take into account questions of the technological appropriateness
of various portions of the spectrum for different uses. But such considera-
tions by themselves do not constitute a criterion on the basis of which the
conflict can be resolved.
An examination of the literature reveals two answers commonly ad-
vanced to the question of what it is the central frequency management
authority is trying to do or should be trying to do. The goal cited most
frequently is to minimize interference. An alternative goal often proposed
is maximizing utilization of the frequencies. Statements of this type il-
lustrate the perils involved in viewing the problem as a technical one.
Aside from the fact that these goals are in direct conflict, taken literally
neither seems very attractive. The way to minimize interference is to pro-
hibit all but one individual from radiating. The way to maximize utiliza-
tion is to let every one radiate. The most generous interpretation one can
give to such proposals is to say that they are not meant to be taken liter-
ally. If they cannot be taken literally, however, they have no real mean-
ing, and we are left with the question of what criterion the frequency man-
agement authority should employ in making decisions.
The balance of this article accepts as given the notion that we want to
use frequency spectrum efficiently: that is, market value will be accepted
as the important criterion in deciding how the spectrum ought to be used.
This is a normative judgment, and a variety of rationales for sacrificing
efficiency to other goals have been proposed. These include the hackneyed
allegation that radio communications is an industry in which there is a
special public interest, an argument that has always seemed to be at least
as applicable to printing presses as to the frequency spectrum.
B. Market Simulation by Government Authority
Conceptually, at least, one reform that might be introduced would be
to induce the government agencies responsible for spectrum utilization de-
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cisions to make those decisions on the basis of the market value of frequen-
cies. The Federal Communications Commission and the Interdepartmental
Radio Advisory Committee could move in this direction without legislation,
but it seems unlikely that they will do so, at least without strong pressures
from the Executive and Congress.
The one advantage of this suggestion is its salability. General dissatis-
faction with the present state of affairs, combined with the pressure from
economic quarters to have frequencies sold, has persuaded some that
"economic factors are important;" and while they are not prepared to ac-
cept a market system, the) are quite willing to accept the market criterion.
One fundamental difficulty with this suggestion is pointed up by recent
discussions and recommendations for the creation of a research agency to
undertake economic studies of the spectrum. If the FCC is to assign fre-
quencies in accord with potential price, it must know how much prospec-
tive users would be willing to bid for rights. In practice, it is virtually im-
possible to elicit that information without actually forcing the competing
claimants to incur the relevant costs. Otherwise, it takes little imagination
to visualize the exaggerated nature of the claims that would be made by
competitors for rights to use the frequencies, and of the painful task the
judges would have in deciding whose claim was valid. On the other hand,
that kind of a contest in exaggeration is probably no worse than what
happens under current procedures.
Another fundamental difficulty with the proposal that spectrum authori-
ties adopt market value as a criterion, is the problem of what to do about
rights that have already been granted. Much has been said about the
government never giving away this great natural heritage, but the fact
is that individuals and businesses have been given rights to use spectrum-
rights which are valuable, and which they would not forego lightly. If we
now institute a system of allocation according to willingness to pay, there
is no doubt that the list of those possessing rights would be substantially
revised. Is it reasonable to suppose that any frequency authority would
take rights away from a large number of those who now have them to re-
asmgn them to other individuals who value them more highly? Given the
history of the FCC's inability to reclaim rights, an adjustment of that mag-
nitude is hard to imagine.
The problem is magnified for frequency allocations. Effective use of
the market value criterion would imply wholesale changes in the frequency
allocation tables. Is it reasonable to suppose that any frequency authority
would take entire frequency allocations or significant portions thereof away
from one service and give them to another?
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One of the most serious implications of this inflexibility is the hopeless
outlook for inducing present rights holders to economize on spectrum.
Technologically, there are many ways other resources can be substituted for
frequency spectrum in producing a given signal output, and many others
could be and would be developed if the possessors of rights could capture
the gains that would ensue from economizing on frequency utilization.
Moreover, systems which don't use spectrum, e.g., commercial broad-
casting by wire or coaxial cable, can be substituted for those that do. Un-
less frequency authorities are willing to ruthlessly apply the market cri-
teria, such measures for economizing on frequency will not even be con-
sidered much less put into effect, and the development of technology for
further economizing will be stifled.
A second interesting possibility for reform of the current management
system revolves about the way use rights are defined. In order to control
interference, the FCC now generally specifies the rights of individual users
in terms of production inputs, like the size and shape of the antenna, power
level at the transmitter, etc. This means of control has two disadvantages:
first, it makes it difficult for the user to make input substitutions, e.g., of
transmitter power for antenna size; secondly, it results in different levels of
interference as a function of time of day, day of the year, sun spot cycle,
etc.
Basically, the interference problem is one of energy levels on the same
frequencies at the same time, in the same geographic area. Despite the
fact that many engineers and physical scientists protest, it seems clear that
we could improve the use of frequency spectrum by defining rights in terms
of energy level along geographic contours. Instead of specifying the physi-
cal inputs users can employ, it is suggested that it would be desirable to
specify energy levels they are permitted to impose at various geographic
points. From an interference standpoint there is no reason why we should
be concerned about how those energy levels are created.
Our knowledge of the relationship between inputs and the power levels
that result at various geographic points is uncertain, so that rights would
have to be defined in probabilistic terms, e.g., power levels cannot exceed
a specified amount more than one percent of the time at specific geographic
points, but that problem exists whether we define rights in terms of inputs
or in terms of outputs. The latter practice overcomes the two disadvantages
mentioned above. Spectrum users would be enabled to make alterations to
their physical plants whenever they found it economic to do so, without
consulting the FCC. In addition, spectrum users would be held responsible
for changing their operations as a function of time of day, month of year,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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sun spot cycle, etc., so that they stay within the transmitted power levels
which they have the right to create. It is also reasonable to conjecture
that defining rights in this way would encourage the development of a
more effective system of detection and enforcement of rights than currently
exists. Finally, it is worth noting that the inauguration of this reform is
independent of whether market value is accepted as the criterion for dis-
tributing use rights.
The third modification of present practice which appears attractive is
that of limiting the number of rights in those portions of the spectrum
where such limitations do not now exist. Currently certain segments of
the frequency spectrum are set aside for use by specific services, and any
qualified user engaged in that service is authorized to operate thereon.
From an economic standpoint, this practice is a perfect parallel to the
problem of the good road and the bad road raised by A. C. Pigou in 1920
in "The Economics of Welfare." Individual users will not take into ac-
count the interference (congestion) costs which they impose on others when
they use the spectrum. As Professor Knight pointed out in 1924 in his
article, "Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost," the crux of this
problem lies in the character of the rights individuals have in the resource.'
(In Pigou's example, the road was not owned.) If we are not to have a
market for frequencies, the solution lies in the FCC's limiting the number
of assignments in these segments of the spectrum just as it does for broad-
casting. Here again, however, the criterion problem arises. If there are
to be a limited number of such assignments, how is the FCC to decide
how many there ought to be, and to whom they will be granted?
The above is by no means a complete catalogue or adequate discussion
of steps that might be taken to patch up the existing frequency management
system. It is a sketchy outline of the steps which appear to promise the
most in increased effectiveness, but even if all of those steps were taken, it is
doubtful that they would significantly improve spectrum utilization.
II. A MARKET SYSTEM FOR FREQUENCIES
It is neither necessary nor appropriate to discuss in detail how a market
system for frequencies would operate: the one big difference between it
and what we have now is simply that individual frequency rights would
be transferable in whole or in part, and in terms of the three dimensions
of bandwidth, geographic location, and time. Taking that single step of
conferring the right to sell spectrum would go far toward correcting the
3. Knight, Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, in THE ETHICS OF COM-
PETITION 217 (2d ed. 1936).
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deficiencies enumerated in the early pages of this article. The resultant
system might not be optimal, but it would certainly be a significant im-
provement over either the present system or the present system modified
as outlined above.
There is, however, enormous resistance to that change. Aside from the
vested interests, which one would expect to be opposed to a market system,
many are suspicious of the idea largely because it seems to them to be a
radical change. In truth, as Professor Coase has pointed out, this "novel
theory" was novel with Adam Smith.'
From a political action standpoint, making existing rights transferable
has the advantage that present holders thereof would tend to favor the
change since the effect will be to increase the value of their rights. Making
rights transferable, however, would not correct all the deficiencies men-
tioned above. For example, it would not correct the "congestion" problem
in those portions of the spectrum where assignments are now essentially
unlimited, and rights would still be defined in terms of inputs rather than
outputs. However, these problems could be resolved in the context of a
market system at least as well or better than outside that context. In those
portions of the spectrum that are overused (congested) some users would
buy out others, reducing the level of interference. Professor Coase has pre-
sented substantial evidence to support the view that, left alone, the courts
will develop reasonable definitions of rights. In particular they would in
the end define rights in terms of outputs, if that definition proves to be
the most efficient. Most important of all, of course, making rights trans-
ferable would provide incentives to owners of those rights to use them
economically.
The objections which have been advanced to using prices to allocate
frequencies generally do not dispute these advantages. The exception to
this is the question sometimes raised of whether the extent of monopoly
in broadcasting and the communications industries would thereby be in-
creased. Fear that a single firm might buy up all of the frequency spectrum
is the extreme expression of this question. There is no reason to believe
that a market for frequencies would be any more susceptible to monopoly.
It is doubtful that AT&T, NBC, ABC and CBS will be the major sponsors
of legislation designed to create a market for frequencies. In any case, we
have anti-trust laws specifically designed to handle the problem of mo-
nopoly, and there is no reason why frequency monopoly problems can't
be handled under those laws just as is the case for other resources.
A second source of objection to using prices stems from the urge to pro-
4. Coase, supra note 2, at 18.
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tect and subsidize activities which particular individuals or groups regard
as important. In the case of the frequency spectrum, the most sacred of
all cows is perhaps the hydrogen line. If you would like to make your-
self persona non grata among your physical science friends, just suggest
that you think those who wish to use the hydrogen line for research should
pay for it.
The next most sacred cow is the amateur bands, followed closely by the
forest service, the fire departments, police departments, et al. The vehe-
mence with which the various protagonists defend the view that these
agencies or services ought to have frequencies free is impressive, to say
the least, and they are not disturbed from their position by the point that
police departments are not given cars or radios-fire departments are not
given fire engines or radios-the forest service is not given fire-fighting
equipment-amateurs must buy their radios and antennae. Even the radio
telescopes that are given to the physicists must first be bought by the gov-
ernment. In truth, there is no reason why the agencies shouldn't be forced
to take into account the opportunity costs of frequency spectrum just as
they are forced to take into account other costs.
The last objection to the use of markets for frequencies has serious social
implications outside the realm of economics. There are many who argue
that the government should retain control of frequency spectrum in order
to control the quality of broadcasting, both TV and radio. One can sym-
pathize with those who judge the character of our television as a vast
wasteland. On the other hand, one despairs of looking to the Federal
Communications Commission, which created this wasteland, or to any
other government agency, as the instrumentality for converting it to a
garden. More importantly, there is a potential for censorship implied by
using government control over frequencies as a lever for enforcing higher
standards on broadcasters.
The allegations about the quality of TV and the character of the TV
industry apply a fortiori to the newspaper industry. There are more TV
stations broadcasting in New York City than there are newspapers, and
more competition as a result. Moreover, newspaper content, including
advertisements (to say nothing of magazines and books) is at least as lurid
and inane on the average as what appears on television. Would anyone
seriously suggest that printing presses or newsprint should be controlled,
by the government in order to control the quality of newspapers?
CONCLUSION
Of the two courses of action open to us for improving the utilization of
frequency spectrum, the one which promises significant improvements is
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the introduction of a market system. On the other hand, it seems highly
improbable that the political support necessary for such a reform will be
forthcoming in the near future. Short of that action, there are steps that
could be taken to improve the existing framework, but these cannot be
realized easily either, and even if they are, significant improvements in
spectrum utilization are not likely to ensue. In brief, we should not be op-
timistic that much can be done to undo the mistakes we have made in
the past.
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